Workplace Flexibility Practices in SMEs: Relationship with Performance via Redundancies, Absenteeism, and Financial Turnover by Whyman, Philip B & Petrescu, Alina
 1 
 
Workplace flexibility practices in SMEs: Relationship with performance via 
redundancies, absenteeism and financial turnover
*
 
by Philip B. Whyman and Alina I. Petrescu 
 
This workplace flexibility study uses primary data on private sector Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 
Lancashire, United Kingdom, collected in 2009 during the recent ‘credit crunch’ recession. Key features include: (a) 
objective measures of SME performance; (b) a focus on the previously relatively neglected relationship between 
workplace flexibility practices (WFPs) and three SME performance indicators, namely redundancies, absenteeism 
and financial turnover; and (c) a timely contribution to research on SMEs. Numerical, functional and cost WFPs 
analyses, via zero-inflated Poisson and linear regressions, control for SME and market characteristics. Despite SMEs 
having limited resources, the results show a significant section of SMEs to be innovative and entrepreneurial 
organisations, embracing advancements in employment relations regarding employee discretion, training, 
participative working arrangements and/or job security. Moreover, results indicate that WFPs have the potential to 
assist SMEs in responding to periods of constrained demand. Flexitime and job sharing are associated with low 
permanent-employee redundancies. Training, job security and family friendly practices relate to low absenteeism with 
reductions of up to six annual days per worker. Job security and profit-related pay are associated with high financial 
turnover. Staff pay-freeze links with high financial turnover, but to the detriment of redundancies and absenteeism, 
while management pay-cuts or management pay-freeze relate to low financial turnover. On a cautionary note, 
spending cuts, often enforced by policy makers, may be of limited benefit to SMEs, and thus other approaches would 
appear more fruitful.  
 
 
Introduction: Motivation for Researching Workplace Flexibility in SMEs 
 
Conditions of weak demand are, by definition, problematic for firms, conflicting with organisational interests to 
maintain production and protect human capital assets. One potential response to recessionary pressures relates to an 
increase in workplace flexibility. This approach might enable firms to adapt to new market conditions whilst 
increasing organisational efficiency. It may also have particular resonance for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), due to their limited scale and resources. In Britain, SMEs represent 99.9 percent of companies, account for 
59.2 percent of private sector employment and 51.5 percent of private sector turnover (BERR 2008), so their success 
in adapting to new market conditions is of vital importance to the future of the whole economy. Yet, surprisingly, 
SME research remains under-developed (Chandler and McEvoy 2000; Tocher and Rutherford 2009). 
There is little consensus over an exact definition of workplace flexibility practices (WFPs), which is unexpected 
when taking into account the wide interest in their utilisation from government, policy makers and practitioners. 
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Definitions may also vary according to whether WFPs are conceptualised mainly from the firm's or employees' 
perspective (Hill et al. 2008), with recent literature pointing towards the importance of analysing both perspectives in 
order to understand whether and which WFPs may lead to mutual gains (Whyman and Petrescu, forthcoming).
1
 For 
the purpose of this study, WFPs can be loosely defined to encompass both employee and organisational perspectives, 
as a large number of work arrangements and patterns aimed to enable employees and employers to adjust corporate 
activities in order to adapt to the demands of the working life and the economic climate. Originating in the seminal 
work of Atkinson (1984), the classification of WFPs distinguishes among: numerical flexibility, described as the 
adjustment of the number of workers or of their working time; functional flexibility described as the adjustment of the 
job content or of the ways in which employees are expected to perform their jobs; and cost or wage flexibility 
described as the adjustment of the ways in which pay is decided. Typical examples of practices falling in the 
numerical flexibility category are non-standard contracts such as part-time working, working from home, shift-
working, flexi-time or job sharing. Functional flexibility practices usually include training, job enrichment, team 
work, or allowing employees job autonomy via having a say in the design or content of their job. Cost flexibility 
describes various forms of setting pay systems such as through negotiations with trade unions, profit-related 
payments, merit pay or payment by results.  
The use of flexible working arrangements has been illustrated during the recent British economic recession, when 
it appears that many firms view WFPs as an essential part of a modern employment relationship and a source of 
competitive advantage; for instance in terms of the speed of adapting to the economic climate (CBI 2010). Firms 
faced with difficult economic conditions have increasingly turned to WFPs to resolve competitive pressures and/or to 
reduce costs and remain solvent. For example, in Britain, by July 2009, it was reported that more than two thirds of 
firms had made, intended to make, or considered making, changes to their working patterns via higher use of flexible 
working (CBI 2009). Evidence during this period points to organisations shifting their practices dramatically in favour 
of adopting flexible programmes, including reduced pay or pay-freezes, reduced hours, or increased reliance on casual 
contracts (CBI 2009). Industry surveys in Britain report on WFPs proving their "worth again during the recession", 
and that "the unprecedented co-operation between employers and employees through measures such as short-time 
working, hiring freezes and moderation in pay has helped to minimise job losses" (CBI 2010, p. 1). 
This study, therefore, focuses on the incidence and use of WFPs by SMEs operating within recessionary 
conditions, and utilises objective measures of performance; all aspects generally under-represented in the literature. Its 
                                                     
1
A notable trend in the literature is to define the concept of workplace flexibility in relation to the scope of the study. For instance, Hill et 
al. (2008, p. 152) define flexibility from an employee perspective: "the ability of workers to make choices influencing when, where, and 
for how long they engage in work-related tasks". In contrast, Martinez-Sanchez et al. (2007, p. 648) use an organisational perspective in 
their definition: "we define workplace flexibility as the ability to address changes in labour organization in the workplace". Or, the 
definition of workplace flexibility proposed in this paper claims the middle ground, being inclusive of both perspectives.  
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broad aim is to identify the WFPs used by SMEs, whilst assessing how these can best equip SMEs to deal with 
difficult economic conditions. Fieldwork involved conducting primary data collection during summer 2009, a period 
of time corresponding to the height of the recent economic recession in Britain, on a geographically-focused 
representative sample of Lancashire (UK) based SMEs. The new data brought to light here allows some of the first 
insights into the extent of use of WFPs in these SMEs during recession conditions. Results are useful to SMEs 
suffering from pressures to make redundancies, to minimise absence and obtain high financial turnover during the 
recession, and are also relevant in the long run due to firms facing a difficult economic climate for the foreseeable 
future during a fragile post-recession recovery period. It is anticipated that findings can inform SME managers, public 
policy makers and practitioners of methods to reduce costs in the organisations surveyed, having potentially wider 
applicability. 
Literature, Theory, and Hypotheses 
 
Addressing Literature Gaps: WFPs and SME Objectively-Measured Performance during Recession 
The literature on human resource management (HRM) and, more specifically, upon workplace flexibility practices 
(WFPs) within SMEs, has been historically under-developed, as studies have tended to focus upon larger 
organisations, possibly due to their greater resources and accompanying specialisation in management functions, 
including the design and implementation of human resource strategies (Cassell et al. 2002; Chandler and McEvoy 
2000; Deshpande and Golhar 1994; Georgiadis and Pitelis 2012; Matlay 2002; Tocher and Rutherford 2009). This 
research deficit has begun to be addressed (for example, Smith and Zagelmayer 2010; Tocher and Rutherford 2009) 
and this paper seeks to make a further contribution in this regard. 
WFPs are generally discussed, within the literature, in the context of the high performance workplace practices 
(HPWPs) thesis, which holds that organisations may secure improved outcomes through utilisation of progressive 
elements of HRM strategy, seeking to create a motivated and committed workforce through providing employees with 
a greater sense of personal control and efficacy (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Berg et al. 2004; Glover and Butler 2012). 
Specific initiatives include the promotion of functional flexibility, multi-skilling, autonomous work teams, problem-
solving groups (i.e. quality circles and suggestion schemes), induction and inter-personal skills training, team briefing, 
information disclosure and appraisal schemes, together with greater opportunities for self-management and/or 
employee participation in decision-making (Osterman 2000; Wood and de Menezes 1998; Wood et al. 2003). 
There is some evidence, contained within the literature, that WFPs are perceived as helping to obtain a better 
work-life balance, which has the potential to reduce the incidence of accidents, grievances, stress and labour turnover, 
and increase job satisfaction and commitment (Origo and Pagani 2008). In relation to organisational benefits, family-
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friendly policies are found to facilitate a reduction in labour turnover and absenteeism (Barmby, Ercolani and Treble, 
2004; Lusinyan and Bonato 2007). For employers, Lazear (1998) shows that the main reason to introduce new WFPs 
is to lower unit costs, expressed as a ration of wages to production costs. WFPs also appear to facilitate lower 
absenteeism, higher retention and lower retraining costs, which are desirable outcomes especially when businesses 
face an economic downturn (Dex and Smith 2002; Eaton 2003; Lusinyan and Bonato 2007). Related studies show that 
organisations with family-friendly policies are better at retaining employees even if the employees choosing to remain 
within the organisation do not use the policies themselves (Grover and Crooker 1995; Yanadori and Kato 2009). 
Organisations with good work-life balance appear to retain superior levels of employee commitment, loyalty and 
motivation, and hence have fewer problems recruiting and retaining talented, productive employees (Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2006a; Maxwell et al. 2007; Russell, O'Connell, and McGinnity 2009). 
However, despite this array of evidence, the impact of HPWPs on various measures of corporate performance 
remains uncertain: the literature has not reliably established the theoretical ways or the HPWPs through which 
organisational performance can be obtained (Buller and McEvoy 2012; Guest 2011; Stavrou, Brewster, and 
Charalambous 2010; Thompson 2011; Whyman et al. 2009), or whether a mutual benefit or equitable distribution of 
gains may be secured (Kelly 2004; Upchurch et al. 2008; Whyman and Petrescu, 2013). 
One aspect arising from the high performance and WFP literature is the importance of evaluating individual 
elements of a given programme of innovations both separately, but also in terms of their effectiveness as part of 
bundled implementation (Batt and Valcour 2003; Eaton 2003). Many studies focus upon individual aspects, or small 
bundles, of WFPs treated in isolation (Chandler and McEvoy 2000; Gray 2002), whereas this runs the risk of 
overlooking important links between their use and performance, whilst potentially omitting potential trade-offs 
between individual aspects of an overall programme (Whyman et al. 2009). Individual aspects may be complimentary 
or create dysfunctional outcomes if implemented simultaneously (Perry-Smith and Blum 2000). Moreover, studies 
that fail to distinguish between individual components of flexible working risk omitted variable bias (Robinson and 
Wilson 2006). Hence, this paper adopts a disaggregated approach to testing the effectiveness of flexibility initiatives. 
A second area where the existing literature is weak pertains to how organisations, and particularly SMEs, innovate 
in their HRM practices in response to periods of recessionary conditions or crises, whether analysed from a contingent 
or universalistic perspective, and with learning driven by a manager-imposed agenda or by managers in partnership 
with their employees (see Bryson 1996; Buller and McEvoy 2012; Carmeli and Schaubroeck 2008; Evans, Harvey, 
and Turnbull 2012; Glover and Butler 2012; Spillan and Hough 2003; Tocher and Rutherford 2009; Whyman and 
Petrescu 2013). Like other firms, conditions of weaker market demand typically cause SMEs to consider pursuing 
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cost reductions and/or higher performance. Yet, in contrast to larger firms, SMEs must fashion a response without the 
benefit provided by the degree of resources and management specialisation available to larger firms (Deshpande and 
Golhar 1994; Georgiadis and Pitelis 2012; Levy and Powell 1998). The use of human resource flexibility practices is 
different in SMEs than in larger firms due to the former having generally leaner and more unified organisational 
structures, differential patterns of ownership and fewer management changes (Golden 2009; Matlay 2002; Storey 
2002). It has been suggested that SMEs might adopt a more informal, reactive and short-term view in their business 
strategies (Golden 2009; Matlay 2002; Storey 2002; Tocher and Rutherford 2009). Furthermore, they are also less 
likely to have the expertise and knowledge that enable larger companies to introduce WFPs (Dex and Scheibl 2001). 
A third aspect where this paper seeks to contribute to the literature relates to its use of objective measures of 
performance. Whilst subjective data provides useful insights into actor motivations and perceptions, they can be 
criticised as potentially unreliable.
2
 A significant feature of this study is that the role of a relatively large number of 
WFPs can be assessed in relation to objectively-measured performance indicators in the respective SME. Specifically, 
the measures of performance used in the analysis have been obtained directly from SME respondents in the form of 
objective quantifications of redundancies, absenteeism and financial turnover at the level of the SME. The choice of 
corporate performance indicators aims to encapsulate some of the most difficult decisions faced by SMEs during a 
recession event, in order to assess which WFPs associate significantly with the implementation of: (1) cost-cutting via 
downsizing and in particular laying off permanent employees; (2) securing low levels of absenteeism; and (3) 
pursuing improved performance by maintaining or enhancing financial turnover. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
There is no generally accepted theory of WFPs (Whyman et al. 2009). Hence the theoretical proposition applied in 
this paper is to decompose flexibility into the three distinct numerical, functional and cost flexibility areas identified 
by Atkinson (1984). Primary data has been gathered to map WFPs onto these three flexibility areas, adopting a 
disaggregated model of flexibility (Whyman and Baimbridge 2006; Whyman et al. 2009).
3
 
The rationale for the disaggregation of WFPs is that theoretically equivalent choices are available to firms in 
reaching corporate goals by substituting or complementing different types of WFPs. For instance, one or a 
combination of the following may lead to labour cost savings, be it in the form of lower wage bills or higher worker 
productivity: numerical WFPs via flexitime; functional WFPs via training or job enrichment; or cost WFPs via pay-
                                                     
2
Numerous studies use subjective performance indicators such as perceived general performance and perceived financial performance, or 
less quantifiable measures of performance including employee morale, organisational commitment, manager-rated organisational 
performance or job satisfaction (Dex and Scheibl 2001; DTI 2005; Giardini and Kabst 2008; Origo and Pagani 2008). 
3
Other decompositions of WFPs have been utilised in a number of studies examining aspects of flexibility (Caroli et al. 2010; Kalleberg 
2001; Martinez-Sanchez et al. 2007; Origo and Pagani 2008; Van der Mer and Ringdal 2009). 
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freezes and cuts, or individual performance related pay. Moreover, flexibility initiatives may have differential impact 
– some more powerful than others – so in this paper the possibility of trade-offs in impact between different practices 
can be examined. Thus, the disaggregation of WFPs addresses a gap in the literature where most studies assume that 
forms of flexibility are mutually exclusive and few assess a large number of WFPs simultaneously (Kalleberg 2001; 
Whyman et al. 2009). 
This paper tests three hypotheses constructed on the shared view in the literature that numerical, functional and 
cost WFPs are expected to induce productivity and strengthen commitment from employees whose needs are better 
met in a flexible workplace. In essence, it is hypothesised that SMEs implementing WFPs might be associated with: 
(1) low redundancies as a measure of how well they manage their workforce; (2) low absenteeism as a measure of 
employees looking forward to taking an active part of a flexible workplace and not skiving; and (3) high financial 
turnover as a measure of SME competitiveness under recession. In view of the cross-sectional nature of the data 
available, it is stated that the expected relationships tested here are with regard to the association between an 
organisation's flexibility profile and its performance, as opposed to the impact of flexibility practices on performance. 
The latter could have only been proven if longitudinal data were available.  
The first hypothesis is that WFPs support SME entrepreneurs in limiting the pressures that recession puts on 
workforce via downsizing. It would be expected that an efficient and innovative use of WFPs might relate to a low 
number of redundancies (Eaton 2003). This would be the case especially with regard to the number of permanent 
employees. According to the flexible firm 'core-periphery' theory, permanent ('core') employees would be less likely 
to be made redundant than non-standard ('periphery') employees, as the latter will often be used to provide a degree of 
organisational flexibility necessary to protect the 'core' workers from the vagaries of change (Atkinson 1984; 
Kalleberg 2001). Permanent employees might be expected, therefore, to receive a higher priority than the peripheral 
workforce, in terms of greater job security, training in firm specific knowledge, intra-firm career plans and 
opportunities of functional flexibility (Atkinson 1984). The assumption, similar to the one of internal labour markets 
theory (Doeringer and Piore 1971), is that, when offering permanent contracts to its workers, an organisation is then 
more committed to integrating these employees in its highly skilled workforce. Consequently, relative to non-
permanent workers, laying off core workers would be more costly if at least in terms of redundancy pay. It may also 
be relatively more damaging to workforce morale to experience core workforce redundancies. Another significant 
detrimental effect of redundancies is that they signal to outsiders that the organisation is facing major difficulties.  
It is, moreover, hypothesised that WFPs are instrumental in creating a workplace climate beneficial to the 
organisation and the employee in terms of a wide variety of measures. For instance, as previously mentioned in the 
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literature review in this paper, WFPs may lead to a better work-life balance, increases in job satisfaction and 
commitment, lower unit costs, easier recruitment and retention of talent, or higher employee productivity (Bloom and 
Van Reenen 2006a; Dex and Smith 2002; Eaton 2003; Lazear 1998; Lusinyan and Bonato 2007; Maxwell et al. 2007; 
Origo and Pagani 2008; Russell, O'Connell, and McGinnity 2009). Hence, retention should be relatively high in SMEs 
making an efficient use of WFPs, and organisational benefits should ensue as WFPs lead to lower labour turnover. 
Specifically with regard to retention, Kacmar et al. (2006) find that labour turnover has an impact on unit-level 
performance in terms of both sales and profit. Moreover, Dex and Smith (2002) also find that labour turnover is lower 
in companies that offer job sharing, flexitime, and working from home and help with childcare to their employees. 
Furthermore, achieving lower labour turnover may be easier for SMEs than for larger organisations. To this extent, 
the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 (WERS 2004) shows that SMEs are less likely than larger 
firms to have lost a quarter or more of the workforce in the previous twelve months: 27 percent of SMEs reported this 
fall in their workforce compared to 45 percent of larger organisations (Forth, Bewley, and Bryson 2006).
4
 
Hypothesis 1: The use of WFPs (numerical, functional and cost flexibility practices) is associated with low levels of 
permanent employee redundancies. 
The second hypothesis assumes that WFPs are conducive to a less absent workforce, for instance since employees 
are enabled to diminish the mismatch between their contractual and desired hours or work, maintain a better work-life 
balance, and do not need to take unnecessary time off work. Brown and Sessions (1996) have offered a seminal 
contribution to the theoretical and empirical analysis of absenteeism. Yet, studies of absenteeism have concentrated on 
its determinants, mainly individual characteristics, or the impact on absenteeism of institutional frameworks and 
employment regulation (see Drago and Wooden 1992; Frick and Malo 2008). Few studies have analysed the 
relationship between WFPs and absenteeism. Among the exceptions, a recent large scale empirical research project in 
Europe has found that WFPS can reduce substantially corporate levels of absence (Lusinyan and Bonato 2007). In 
Britain in particular, Barmby, Ercolani, and Treble (2004) report that the flexibility in the contractual hours of work is 
a more important factor in determining absence than even individual characteristics. The second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: The use of WFPs (numerical, functional and cost flexibility practices) is associated with low levels of 
absenteeism. 
The third hypothesis assumes that WFPs allow organisations to make an efficient use of their financial resources 
and be productive, based on the manifold benefits of utilising WFPs to the employee and employer highlighted in the 
literature on WFPs and on HPWPs. The assumptions are rooted in the human capital theory that a better skilled and 
                                                     
4
The WERS 2004 is the fifth wave in a series of British surveys aimed to provide a nationally representative view of employment relations 
in British workplaces (DTI, 2005). For more information, visit www.wers2004.info/. 
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more knowledgeable worker is a more productive worker (Becker 1964). Yet, due to the limited range of the 
literature, there is no clear understanding in firms in general, and in SMEs in particular, of which practices can be 
linked to corporate performance. Moreover, the literature does not always sufficiently disaggregate WFPs in 
order to test whether each individual aspect impacts productivity (exceptions include Whyman et al. 
forthcoming), but a few studies do indicate that a range of WFPs seem to be associated with productivity 
improvement. Of those studies which focus specifically on SMEs, using US data, Way (2002) finds that HPWPs 
leave labour productivity unaffected in small businesses, whilst in the UK, Maxwell et al. (2007) report that WFPs 
lead to positive impacts in recruitment and retention, enhanced employee relations, commitment and loyalty, but also 
to operational problems and administrative burdens. Yet, an internationally comparative study by Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2006a), drawing upon SME data from the USA, France, Germany and the UK, find that better work-life 
balance practices are significantly associated with higher productivity. One weakness with the few British studies of 
SMEs available, relates to their focus on the incidence of WFPs rather than a measure of the impact (Bacon and 
Hoque 2005; Cassell et al. 2002; Dex and Schreibl 2001; Matlay 2002). Motivated by the fragmented picture of extant 
research into SMEs' use of WFPs with regard to performance, this paper proposes to test the following third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The use of WFPs (numerical, functional and cost flexibility practices) is associated with high levels of 
financial turnover. 
Data, Variables and Methodology 
Data 
Primary data is derived from a survey of managers of SMEs (with human resource responsibility) in the 
Lancashire region of the United Kingdom, conducted during August 2009, at the height of the recent 'credit crunch' 
economic recession. For the purpose of this paper, an SME is defined based on the official criteria established by the 
European Union as an organisation with fewer than 250 employees and financial turnover of less than 50 million euro 
(66.6 million US dollars) (European Union 2003; European Commission 2002). The initial contact information for 
firms was obtained from the Central Lancashire Business Directory 2008 - 09 (CLBD2008-09) collected by the 
Preston City Council. This was a voluntary geographically-defined dataset, providing such details as employment size 
and industrial categories, and contained in excess of 3,300 businesses, of which 2,053 were SMEs. National statistical 
estimates suggested that this captured 44 percent of the potential total population (ONS 2009). In terms of 
stratification by size, the CLBD 2008-09 sample was similar to the North-West region of the UK, although compared 
to the nation as a whole it did under-represent micro firms (70 percent as opposed to 88 percent in the UK) and over-
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represent small (23 percent as opposed to nine percent) and medium (seven percent as opposed to three percent) firms 
(BERR 2008).  
Of the 2,053 SMEs in the targeted sample, a combination of e-mail and postal questionnaires were utilised, in an 
attempt to maximise response rates. A passcode allowed respondents the option of filling in the questionnaire online. 
The response rate achieved was 7.1 percent, corresponding to 147 SMEs, which was reduced to the usable sample of 
135 SMEs, after discarding unusable entries due to missing observations. Allowing for well-known difficulties in 
SME data collection such as difficulty of access, small response rates or small number of observations, the size of the 
usable dataset sample can be considered as acceptable (Dillman 1999; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe 1993).  
By size, 59 percent of the sample were micro-SMEs (employed fewer than 10 people), with 32 percent employing 
between 10 and 49 people and nine percent between 50 and 249 employees. The participant sample closely mirrored 
the CLBD 2008-09 population, hence data weighing was not considered necessary. Further descriptives for the 135 
SMEs in the sample used in this paper can be summarised as follows. All SMEs were active in the private sector. 
Almost all SMEs (97 percent of the sample) were non-unionised workplaces, with the same proportion being 
independent as opposed to being part of a larger organisation. Two thirds of the sampled firms were family owned
5
, 
whilst for about a quarter of the sample, female staff represented a majority of the workforce. A third of the sampled 
firms had been in business for less than 10 years, with a similar proportion hiring workforces where more than a third 
of the employees had a university degree. Only 13 percent of respondent firms had a specialised human resources 
manager. In terms of the industry composition, a fifth of the sampled SMEs were active in the manufacturing sector.
6
  
Two particular SME characteristics, namely ownership type and industry sector, may influence the spread of 
WFPs. For instance, Moshavi and Koch (2005) suggest surprisingly that family-owned firms are less likely to adopt 
family-friendly WFPs, Bloom and Van Reenen (2006b) associate a high proportion of the 'badly managed firms" to 
family ownership, while Woodland et al. (2003) reports that WFPs are more prevalent in the public than private 
sector. In view of these findings, our analysis of a private sector sample of mostly family-owned firms is likely to 
underestimate the incidence and usefulness of WFPs. 
 
Dependent Variables: SME Performance Indicators 
                                                     
5
Family-owned SMEs form a large proportion of SMEs in other countries too - see the study in US by Carlson, Upton, and Seaman (2006).  
6
Since their economic profile and strategies would be too specific and different than for the rest of organisations in the sample, SMEs from 
the following three sections based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 2003) are excluded from the survey of Lancashire SMEs: 
Section A “Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry”; Section B “Fishing”; and Section C “Mining and Quarrying”. This is in line with the 
sample definition restrictions observed in similar organisational research in Britain, such as the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WIRS / WERS) series (see Bryson, Green, and Whitfield 2008). 
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Redundancies, absenteeism and financial turnover are the three dependent variables used in order to capture varied 
aspects of SME performance. Table 1 summarises the main statistics and correlations for the dependent and 
independent variables used in this paper. Correlation indexes among SME performance indicators are under 0.3, 
which indicates that redundancies, absenteeism and financial turnover measure different aspects of SME performance 
and validates the inclusion in analysis of all three dependent variables.  
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
Redundancies are reported in response to the question "How many people in your organisation have been made 
redundant due to recession in the last 12 months?". The majority of the sampled SMEs (109 SMEs, or 82 percent) 
reported not laying off employees due to recession. Still, permanent employees were laid off in 24 SMEs, or one in six 
of the organisations in the sample, and the size of redundancies ranged from one to 14 permanent employees. A total 
of 87 permanent employees were, therefore, laid off due to the recession, representing 3.4 percent of the 2,509 
employees in the sample. Moreover, it is important to remember that these labour turnover figures, though relatively 
small, usually represent a proportionally significant reduction in an SME's workforce. In fact, data indicate that due to 
the recession in the 12 months up to July 2009, and taking 2008 as the base year, 16 SMEs, representing 12 percent of 
SMEs in the sample, released more than 10 percent of their workforce. 
Absenteeism is measured as work days lost per employee in the 12 months up to July 2009. These exclude work 
days lost as part of authorised leave of absence, employee participation on secondment or courses, or days lost 
through industrial action. Descriptives show that zero-levels of absenteeism per employee are reported in 2009 for 35 
percent of SMEs in the sample. The average reported annual absence is 5.5 days per employee, which is relatively 
lower than the British national average in the private sector standing at 6.4 days in 2009 (CIPD 2009). One of the few 
industry reports analysing workplace practices under recession during 2009 also highlights that four in ten employers 
intended to increase their organisational focus on reducing absence levels and associated costs (CIPD 2009). This is in 
line with predictions based on the economic shirking models, whereby increased unemployment or job security threats 
are expected to exert downwards pressure on absenteeism levels (Shapiro and Stigliz 1984). 
Financial turnover is reported by SMEs as total turnover obtained in the 12 months up to July 2009. This data is 
used for the third dependent variable which is an objective measure of financial corporate performance. Due to 
skewness, a natural logarithmic transformation is employed. In the sample used here, annual financial turnover figures 
in 2009 reached on average under half a million pounds, with half of the SME respondents reporting that their 
financial turnover was under 210,000 British pounds (335,741 US dollars). 
Independent Variables: Workplace Flexibility Practices 
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A total of twelve independent variables are analysed, comprising three sets of four WFPs included in analysis for 
each flexibility area: numerical, functional and cost. An interesting finding, in Table 1, is the large extent to which 
SMEs implement some WFPs. SMEs report making significant use of WFPs overall, and focusing upon certain types 
of WFPs before the recession. In particular, faced by recessionary pressures, SMEs experimented with extending the 
range of WFPs implemented. About a third of the SME sample made use of part-time working and staff pay-freezes; 
over 40 percent used home or mobile work and family friendly practices; and 70 percent or more offered job security, 
training or job enrichment, and used teams, job autonomy or employee involvement. 
This result is in line with those that point to SME inherent flexibilities in adopting practices, yet, due to the sense 
of informality in the way SMEs adopt practices, the latter may limit the development of more complex working 
arrangements (Smith and Zagelmayer 2010; Tocher and Rutherford 2009). Moreover, the fact that SMEs have more 
limited resources to withstand market pressures arising from recessionary condition - and, thereby, have a high 
incentive to implement human resource innovations - may also frustrate a consistent, systematic development of WFP 
bundles due to the lack of HRM specialisation and/or resources made available to train managers and hence raise their 
awareness of the potential benefits derived from WFPs (Trocher and Rutherford 2009). Hence, there is an expectation 
in the literature that SMEs may implement a mix of irregular, informal practices (Smith and Zagelmayer 2010). By 
contrast, this paper shows a rather consistently high number of WFPs are implemented in the sample of SMEs 
analysed, and as a consequence, it is this degree of implementation that is an unexpected, positive finding. 
The selection of twelve WFPs, shown in Table 1, is made based on a variety of criteria, including: the extant 
literature interest in the particular WFPs; the incidence of practices as shown in the means column in Table 1; and the 
correlation coefficients between / among practices.
7
 According to the latter criterion, where correlation coefficients 
were found to be above 0.7, and where there was an intrinsic relationship among practices, WFPs were included in 
analysis as a representation of more than one practice. This was the case for four of the twelve WFPs: (1) 
Home_or_MobileWork representing home working or mobile working; (2) Teams_or_JobAut_or_EI representing 
teamworking, job autonomy or employee initiative; (3) Train_or_JobEnrichment representing training or job 
enrichment via training; and (4) MgtPayCut_or_PayFreeze_or_BonusCut representing management pay-cuts, freezes 
or bonus cut. The standard deviation column in Table 1 shows that the incidence of flexibility practices was wide in 
the SMEs sample, with values around 30 percent to 50 percent.  
Method and Methodology 
The following economic models are constructed to test each of the three hypotheses: 
                                                     
7
 See Appendix 1 containing a brief description of the twelve WFPs.    
 12 
 
Redundancies = a1 + b1 FIRM + c1 WFP + u1         (1) 
Absenteeism = a2 + b2 FIRM + c2 WFP + u2         (2) 
Financial Turnover = a3+ b3 FIRM + c3 WFP + u3         (3) 
where, the left-hand side terms are the dependent variables; for i = 1, 2, to 3 the ai are constant terms, bi and ci are 
coefficients to be estimated and ui are error terms; FIRM is a vector of SME workplace characteristics; and WFP is a 
vector of workplace flexibility practices. Since WFPs are entered in each equation as three sets of numerical, 
functional and, respectively cost WFPs, there are nine econometric models tested (see Figure 1).  
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
The dependent variables Redundancies and Absenteeism have non-negative integer values and a non-negligible 
proportion of non-zero values pertaining to a positive finding that despite recession most SMEs report zero levels of 
absence per employee and manage not to make any of their permanent employees redundant. So the appropriate 
econometric estimation for models (1) and (2) is zero-inflated Poisson models. This is indicated by the Vuong (1989) 
test statistic, which at positive levels above 1.96 shows a preference of a zero-inflated Poisson model over a simple 
nonzero-inflated Poisson regression.
8
 Model (3) is estimated as a log-linear model via a multiple linear regression. 
Encoding financial turnover using the natural logarithm function allows this dependent variable to follow the normal 
distribution so linear regression can be applied. The large selection of practices used in this study has captured 
significantly the variance in SME performance, as shown by values of R squared around 32 percent and highly 
significant F test statistics.  
Multicollinearity is not an issue in analysis, as can be seen in the correlation matrix in Table 1 where, with a few 
exceptions, the absolute magnitude of correlations is below 0.3. The finding that SMEs in the sample did not 
implement WFPs in a strong associative way, offers support to the decision of assessing the relationships between 
individually specified WFPs and SME performance indicators. Thus, in contrast to indirectly modelling workplace 
flexibility via 'bundles' of practices, this paper pursues a direct and individual analysis of relationships between WFPs 
and SME performance indicators.
9
 
In addition to WFPs, a set of six workplace characteristics was introduced in each model to control for effects on 
company performance other than those related to WFPs. These were: firm size; a dummy for family firm ownership; a 
dummy for the firm being active in the manufacturing sector; the share of female employees in the non-managerial 
                                                     
8
See Appendix 2 containing technical notes on the methods of analysis used. 
9
The 'bundle' hypothesis refers to testing whether practices may be grouped into scales, scores or indexes of practices, using factor analysis 
for such grouping. However, there is criticism that, via these techniques, practices would be grouped in an ad-hoc manner, too remote from 
rationales of implementation in the firm, hence certain authors have cautioned against 'bundles' (Black and Lynch 2001; Van der Meer and 
Ringdal 2009). 
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workforce; the share of female managers in the managerial workforce; and a dummy for the SME manager reporting 
perceived high market competition. 
Discussion of Results 
 
Table 2 shows a summary of results and lists, at a glance, the statistically significant relationships between WFPs 
and the three SME performance indicators: redundancies, absenteeism and financial turnover. The interesting 
variation in the connotation of results, whereby some WFPs are positively or negatively associated with SME 
performance, justifies the rationale for the disaggregated approach adopted by this paper and the testing of different 
performance measures. 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
There is mixed support for the three hypotheses established in this paper. Potential trade-offs faced by SMEs are 
highlighted, since some WFPs may have a positive relationship with a performance measure, but a negative 
relationship with another performance measure. For instance, staff pay freeze is likely to have a positive relationship 
with financial turnover, but a negative relationship with redundancies and absenteeism. On the one hand, as 
hypothesised, relationships between some WFPs and SME performance indicators have a positive connotation. For 
example, family friendly practices, training and job sharing are associated with low absenteeism, while flexitime and 
profit related pay are associated with low redundancies. On the other hand, some WFPs have a negative relationship 
with SME performance. For instance, location flexibility via working from home or mobile work, 
Home_or_MobileWork, is linked with high absenteeism and low financial turnover.  
Full results, shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5, are obtained by testing relationships between WFPs and SME 
performance while WFPs are introduced in three sets: numerical flexibility practices, functional flexibility practices, 
and cost flexibility practices. Hence, there are three economic models tested for each of the three SME performance 
indicators, leading to the total of nine models.
10
 
TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
Within the numerical, functional and cost types of workplace flexibility, WFPs are analysed in decreasing 
incidence order, which enables observing that the most used practices are not necessarily also those with the most 
significant positive association to SME performance. For instance, in the functional flexibility area, the WFPs with the 
                                                     
10
Due to a relatively low number of observations in the sample of 135 SMEs, and to an interest in assessing separately the three specific 
areas of workplace flexibility (namely, numerical, functional and cost WFPs), the twelve WFPs of interest in this paper are not entered all 
at the same time in a single analysis, but rather introduced as three sets of four practices at a time. See Figure 1. 
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highest incidence is Teams_orJobAut_orEI and results show it has a negative relationship with SME performance, 
being linked with high levels of absenteeism.  
The literature has suggested that micro-SMEs, defined as SMEs with fewer than ten employees, have ways of 
organising and responding to their environment which may be different than their larger SME counterparts. For 
instance, Way (2002) suggests that micro SMEs may be more labour-intensive and that their sources of competitive 
advantage would be even more limited. Therefore, results in this paper were also estimated only for the restricted 
sample of micro-SMEs. It can be reported that results for the micro-SMEs did not differ substantially from the overall 
results.
11
  
The remainder of the paper presents, in a joined way, the relationships between, on the one side, workplace 
characteristics, numerical WFPs, functional WFPs and cost WFPs, and, on the other side, the three SME performance 
indicators which are redundancies, absenteeism and financial turnover.  
Workplace Characteristics 
As shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5, most relationships tested between SME workforce size and the three SME 
performance indicators are significant or highly significant. Larger SMEs have a higher propensity, and indeed greater 
scope, to downsize under recessionary pressures and are associated with high levels of absenteeism. Indeed, Agency 
Theory suggests that this type of finding may be due to absence being expensive and difficult to monitor when 
managing larger scale organisations (Eisenhardt 1989). An alternative explanation is that larger SMEs are more likely 
to suffer from the free-rider problem; the larger the workplace, the easier to fail to notice the absence of an employee 
when other employees are present. Furthermore, absenteeism behaviour has been shown in the psychology literature 
to be sometimes influenced by other people's decisions and the size of their group (Olson 1965). So a reason for high 
absenteeism in larger SMEs is that people identify less with one another in bigger groups, making them more likely to 
report sick even though that would let their colleagues down. In relation to the third dependent variable, larger SMEs 
are more likely to associate with high levels of financial turnover, which is an intuitive result. The latter is based, 
theoretically, on the argument that economies of scale lead to a positive correlation between firm size and profitability 
(Hall and Weiss 1967), or that firms operate in strategic similar-sized groups thus allowing them more market power 
the bigger their firm size (Caves and Porter 1977). 
Family ownership is associated with relatively low levels of redundancies but high levels of absenteeism. It may 
create a different structure of leadership and management which is more cohesive with regard to avoiding layoffs in 
recession, but less efficient at counteracting absenteeism. The related literature offers some support to this 
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These results are available from the authors on request. 
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interpretation. Firstly, regarding layoffs, low levels of redundancies may be the result of strong bonds formed within 
family-owned firms, creating a sense of mutual obligation among employees, and allowing better performance, 
communication and integration within the firm when managerial behaviour is closely monitored (Bacon and Hoque 
205; Chrisman et al. 2007; Chu 2011). It may also be the case that greater emphasis on efficiency, in family-owned 
SMEs, could lead to fewer redundancies due to layoffs being perceived as relatively more costly, in view of the 
limited resources available to the firm, whilst also negating the human resource investment - such as via training - 
undertaken by the firm in those employees made redundant (Kim and Gao 2013; Kotey and Folker 2007). Secondly, 
regarding absenteeism, the link between family ownership and high levels of absenteeism could reflect the finding 
that family-owned firms may have lower capability to set clear targets for employees, and consequently exhibit more 
informal employee relations (Bacon and Hoque 2005; Battisti et al. 2009). For instance, Moshavi and Koch (2005) 
suggest, rather counter intuitively, that family-owned firms are less likely to adopt family-friendly WFPs; the 
potentially consequent family-work tensions experienced by employees may explain, partially, the relatively high 
levels of absenteeism associated with family ownership in this paper. Similarly, Bloom and Van Reenen (2006b) and 
Oswald et al. (2009) link a high proportion of the poorly managed firms to family ownership, whilst Woodland et al. 
(2003) find that WFPs are more prevalent in the public than private sector. In view of these insights, it is possible that 
the current analysis, based upon a sample composed of a majority of family-owned firms in the private sector, may 
under-estimate the incidence and usefulness of WFPs in SMEs. 
It has been suggested that workplace practices, for those SMEs in the manufacturing sector, would have a 
different role than in the service sector, for example since the share of employment costs in production costs is 
dissimilar (Bartel, 2004). This paper finds relatively little evidence for this difference, since the manufacturing sector 
variable is relatively not significantly associated with SME performance in Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
The gender composition of the workplace has been analysed intensively in relation to the assumption that a 
workforce with a larger female proportion would implement particular types of flexibility practices (Visser and 
Williams 2006; Moshavi and Koch 2005). Indeed, a large body of literature has focused on the issues related to 
gender composition in the workplace, such as with regard to work-life balance, analysing sometimes issues relevant to 
particular segments of the female workforce e.g. managerial / professional women (Broadbridge 1998; Burke 2001; 
Brett and Stroh 2003; Greenhaus and Beutell 1985; White et al. 2003).  Women may suffer more from family-work 
conflict, and organizations employing more female workers rely inherently more on women, hence WFPs profiles 
may be different in these organisations. Thus, in this paper, two variables assess the female composition of the 
workforce. Firstly, a larger female workforce composition has been generally associated with more part-time work, 
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casualised contracts, and family related practices (Cassidy and Sutherland 2008; Manning and Petrongolo 2008). 
Under the assumptions made by the core-periphery theory, with peripheral workers most likely to be affected by 
recession, workplaces with more casualised contracts would expect to experience high levels of redundancies. 
Moreover, in the absenteeism literature, the female employee has usually been found to have higher levels of absence 
than male employees (Cassidy and Sutherland 2008). When compared to the literature, the findings here do not 
confirm the casualised contract expectations, but confirm the latter expected relationship, namely that workplaces with 
more female employees suffer from higher levels of absenteeism (StaffFemaleShare is highly significant in Table 4, 
Model 4). 
Secondly, the role of the female share of managers, in relation to organisational performance, has received little 
attention, whereas this aspect of organisational structure may be relevant to the intrinsic profile of workplace 
flexibility adopted by the SME. If analysing the gender of the decision-makers, most studies tend to take into account 
only the gender of the senior manager (see Lokke 2007), whereas Ingram and Simons (1995) find that the proportion 
of female managers can be linked to the family-work responsiveness of a business. In the Lancashire SME sample, 
41% of the SMEs have entirely male managerial leaders, whilst just under half of SMEs are led by both male and 
female managers, and 13% of SMEs are entirely led by female managers. The analysis contained in this paper appears 
to indicate that the share of female managers is directly linked to a high likelihood for permanent redundancies, and 
especially to high absenteeism. This may indicate, perhaps, that female managers might prove more sympathetic to 
absence than male counterparts, possibly due to their own experience in this area, or that employees copy their 
manager 'model' behaviour (Kristensen et al. 2006; Nielsen 2008; Perry, Kulik, and Zhou 1999; Visser and Williams 
2006).  
Market competition (Table 3) is highly significant in Model 2 where it has a negative association with 
redundancies. It may imply that the SME prefers to retain experienced employees during recession, as opposed to 
cutting costs via reducing permanent employees, in order to maintain productive potential for the economic recovery. 
Moreover, in Table 4, all models show a highly significant and negative association between a relatively intense 
market competition and absenteeism, suggesting that more competitive settings allow for lesser scope for absence, 
whether justified or 'shirking'. The highly significant and negative association between greater market competition and 
absenteeism, may imply that employees in SMEs respond via low absenteeism (possibly through reduced shirking 
rates) to the pressures that a highly competitive market places upon the organisation. If so, this would appear to be a 
clear example of market discipline. 
Numerical WFPs 
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Home or mobile working is associated with high absenteeism (Table 4) and low financial turnover (Table 5), 
which would appear to confirm the negative perceptions, held by many managers, that these initiatives can facilitate 
shirking. It does, moreover, conflict with the literature in this aspect, which generally supports overall positive 
connotations for implementing home-working, a flexibility practice highly-desired by employees (Gray 2002). Indeed, 
it is often portrayed as providing an alternative to absenteeism, especially incidences of parent absence due to child 
illness. This finding, however, is in line with previous studies which found either little association between working 
from home and corporate performance (Whyman et al. 2009), or suggested that absenteeism may indeed increase if 
home working resulted in the boundary between home and work being more disputed, the employee working too 
many long days, and work-life conflict ensued (Russell, O'Connell, and McGinnity 2009). This is an important matter 
to clarify, since research on modern employment relationships mentions increasing numbers of individuals working 
mainly from home or via mobile work in the UK (Felstead et al. 2002; Gariety and Shaffer 2007). Thus, it remains 
uncertain the extent to which home-working could be a mutually agreed flexible solution to keeping workforce on 
payroll during low labour activity. 
Family friendly practices are highly significantly linked to low absenteeism levels, with marginal effects showing 
a predicted three day per employee per year decrease in absenteeism if family practices are implemented (Table 4, 
Model 4). This positive finding is in line with results in the literature indicating that employees supported in their 
workplace are more likely to reciprocate by taking less absence and being loyal to their employers (Giardini and Kabst 
2008; Goff, Mount, and Jamison 1990; Meyer and Allen 1997). Moreover, organisations with family-friendly policies 
are found to be better at retaining employees; this is the case even when the respective employees choosing to remain 
within the organisation do not use these policies themselves, suggesting that the use of family friendly practices, albeit 
by colleagues of an employee, has an indirect positive spill-over effect on employee retention (Grover and Crooker 
1995; Yanadori and Kato 2009). 
 Part-time working is associated with high redundancies (in Table 3) and low financial turnover (Table 5), but with 
low absenteeism (Table 4). The association with redundancies may be due to part-time working being taken up by 
employees who would otherwise want to be employed full-time but who cannot find such jobs in recession. This 
association may also be a reaction to SMEs facing financial stress, due to falls in demand, cost pressures or need to 
intensify work and efficiency, whereby employers reduce formerly full-time positions and replace them with part-time 
contracts. Moreover, it may conceivably reflect a link with low financial turnover if employers under-utilise part-time 
workers by trapping them in a circle of fewer training and growth opportunities (Francesconi and Gosling 2005; 
Stevens, Brown, and Lee 2004).  
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The use of part-time workers is significantly linked with low rates of absence. The result is significant in both the 
main and the marginal effect (Table 4, Model 4), showing a 1.3 day of annual absence per person predicted difference 
between SMEs with part-time workers and those without. This is a result in line with the literature, such as Barmby, 
Orne, and Treble (1995) reporting that full-time workers had significantly higher absence rates than part-time 
workers, or Giardini and Kabst (2008) finding that a bundle of flexibility practices including part-time work reduced 
absenteeism. One possible theoretical explanation is that, as flexible working time options become available, workers 
can optimise their labour-leisure options to match their contracted with their desired hours, hence absence may 
decrease. Alternatively, it might reflect a less secure employment position resulting in decreased shirking due to the 
pressurised nature of part-time contracts (Visser and Williams 2006). Either way, these results have been replicated by 
an extensive study of absenteeism at European level (Lusinyan and Bonato 2007).  
Flexitime is highly significantly associated with low redundancies (Table 3), hence this WFPs is one which SMEs 
may be able to implement in order to avoid recession-imposed downsizing. So, by varying the times when staff start 
or end working, the firm may be able to fit the cost cutting scenarios imposed by recession without needing to lay off 
as many permanent employees as otherwise.  
Functional WFPs 
Most of the functional flexibility practices are highly significantly associated with lower absenteeism levels, with 
results of a magnitude that implies SMEs adopting Training_Job_Enrichment, Job_Security or Job_Sharing may have 
up to six days less absence per employee per year (Table 4). This is a significant finding, suggesting that these WFPs 
may have the potential to dramatically reduce absence, which is reported to average in Britain at around seven days 
per employee per year (CIPD 2009).  
The exception is Teamwork or job autonomy or employee involvement which is highly significantly associated 
with high levels of absenteeism (in Table 4), in the order of a predicted extra 3.8 days per employee per year. Forms 
of interdependent worker productivity, such as teamwork, are expected to face a higher cost of absence due to 
incurring collectively increased costs from lost productivity, so are found to usually spend more money to lower their 
absence rates (Heywood, Jirjahn, and Wei 2008). However, SMEs have a more limited resource base to monitor 
absence. Still, the result is counterintuitive, because better working conditions, such as where employees have 
discretion over their tasks and feel involved in their work, would be expected to lead to lower absence. 
 There are two feasible explanations for this finding. The first notes similar surprising findings that in some 
organisations flexible job design or teams do not have any impact on absence, as indicated by a Canadian study using 
nationally representative data from 1999-2002 (Dionne and Dostie 2007). Moreover, Drago and Wooden (1992) 
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suggest that the relationship between workgroup cohesion and absenteeism may be mediated by job satisfaction, and 
if job satisfaction is low, there result is higher absence. Peer pressure may produce a similar result, possibly arising 
from an increase in monitoring or stress during recession, leading to unpleasant working conditions (Batt and 
Appelbaum 1995). Teamworking has indeed been found to inculcate a culture of tense supervision (Batt 2004). The 
finding that this WFP is the most widespread in the sample, at 83 percent, is interesting, portraying SMEs in a similar 
respect to the most innovative high-performance organisations which embrace advancements in employment relations 
regarding employee discretion and participative working arrangements. However, the second possible explanation for 
the finding may be the breadth of definition certain SME managers may ascribe to the term teamworking, whereby 
almost any activity might potentially be included, and hence the variable is failing to capture what it intended. Further 
fieldwork would be required to determine the true cause. 
Training or job enrichment is correlated with higher proportion of employees with degree, a variable which could 
not be used in the analysis because it was also (negatively) highly correlated with family-owned SMEs. However, the 
correlation with relatively highly-educated workforce may help explain the association with absenteeism (Jones et al. 
2009). Results in Table 4 show that absenteeism may be reduced by 5.9 days per employee per year in SMEs utilising 
this WFP. In contrast to the view that WFPs may have limited incidence in SMEs, training or job enrichment is the 
second most spread WFP in the sample, being utilised by fully 71 percent of SMEs included in the sample, followed 
closely in the third place at 70 percent by job security.  
Job security is associated with high redundancies (in Table 3), but low absenteeism (Table 4) and high financial 
turnover (Table 5). The latter observation is unproblematic, with employees who feel safe in their job potentially 
experiencing greater motivation, whilst tenure is associated with greater human capital acquisition and hence 
productivity, and therein associated with higher corporate performance measures. In more detail, compared to SMEs 
without job security for employees, results in Table 5 suggest that SMEs offering employees job security are likely to 
have financial turnover levels that are higher by a factor of 1.2.
 12
 Interestingly, the relationship between job security 
and absenteeism suggests that motivation effects outweigh the potential to shirk, at least amidst recessionary 
conditions. However, it is the link between job security and high redundancies which is most intriguing. This may 
reflect one of a number of potential causes, including changing definitions of what constitutes ‘security’, particularly 
amidst a recession. Similarly, it may reflect a disparity between what employers claim is a 'secure' working 
environment and the evidence drawn from objective data. Alternatively, SMEs with job security, which is usually 
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In models where the dependent variable has been log-transformed and the predictors have not, the format for interpretation is that 
dependent variable changes by 100*(coefficient) percent for a one unit increase in the independent variable while all other variable in the 
model are held constant. Hence, if a certain practice is introduced (that is a change from zero to one in its status equivalent to a one unit 
increase in the independent variable), the dependent variable which is natural logarithm of turnover changes, as a percentage, by 100 times 
the coefficient.  
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associated with high-end jobs, may be a priori suffering more from recession, suggesting that sectors of highly-skilled 
workforce could have been relatively harder hit by recession-related redundancies than those with lower skilled 
workforce. 
Job sharing is significantly linked with low redundancies (Table 3) and highly significantly linked with low 
absenteeism (Table 4). As shown in Table 1, Job sharing is the WFP with the lowest incidence in the sample (12 
percent). Hence, the finding that it may associate with low redundancies points to the unexploited potential of this 
practice to help SMEs maintain their workforce size, whilst also benefiting from low absenteeism. Yet, the low uptake 
of this practice may hide certain drawbacks feared by the employees who would be job sharing. Reporting on 
Australian data, McDonald, Bradley, and Brown (2008) mention that this WFP can be mixed with part-time work, but 
very little research has looked at the distinction and its consequences to career opportunities. Still, both WFPs may 
lead to similarly reduced career opportunities, due to the perception that job-sharing, like part-time working, is the 
choice of individuals avoiding the toil of full-time work (McDonald, Bradley, and Brown 2008). 
Cost WFPs 
Managerial pay cut or pay freeze or bonus cut shows a significant association with low financial performance 
(Table 5). Managerial remuneration has attracted a lot of attention recently in Britain, with widely publicised 
incidences of top executives seeing their pay size disputed and having to forgo bonuses (see, for example, Hutton 
2010). This result seems intuitive since firms with high levels of performance would not be expected to need to cut 
managerial pay, whereas firms experiencing financial pressures would be interested to adjust costs including the 
implementation of management pay cuts.  
Staff pay freeze is highly significantly linked to high redundancies (Table 3) and significantly linked to high 
absenteeism (in Table 4). An interpretation of these findings may suggest that staff pay-freezes were implemented in 
SMEs already suffering from the economic recession, hence where staff was being laid off, whilst neo-classical 
economics might suggest that a natural response to lower real rewards would be to reduce work effort. Results also 
show that this cost reduction method associates with high financial turnover, but at marginal significance.  
A surprising finding is the lack of significance of one of the most frequently discussed high-performance practice, 
namely individual performance related pay. This may arise due to a faulty method of implementation, whereby the 
links between performance and reward are obfuscated, or where rewards are skewed to certain groups within the 
workforce, or simply due to rates being set too low, and thereby failing to incentivise staff to achieve desired goals. 
Authors have indeed pointed to the importance in British workplaces of analysing in-depth the way in which 
performance related pay is implemented by managers as a complex instrument to negotiate employee productivity 
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(Marsden 2004). In a detailed study of performance-related-pay in the British public sector in the 1990s, Marsden 
(2004, p. 351) concludes that special attention needs to be paid to how performance norms are set by managers and 
how performance is appraised since otherwise the scheme may not motivate employees but instead lead to 
divisiveness and lack of an association with higher productivity. 
Profit related pay is significantly associated with low redundancies (Table 3) and high financial turnover (in Table 
5). The result echoes suggestions in the literature on forms of pay sharing that such pay systems motivate co-
operation, thereby encouraging higher productivity and employee involvement (Sels et al. 2006; Shepard 1994). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between a set if twelve workplace flexibility practices (WFPs) and three SME 
performance indicators, namely redundancies, absenteeism and financial turnover. The paper seeks to extend the 
literature relating to SME workplace flexibility and objectively measured firm performance, within the context of 
conditions of economic recession. It includes a set of not one, but three measures of performance, thereby showcasing 
variations in the way WFPs associate with firm performance. Moreover, it signals the importance of disaggregation 
studies of workplace flexibility, thereby identifying relationships between individual WFPs and the selected 
performance measures. Disaggregation is significant, because it highlights that some WFPs can be ‘double-edged 
swords’, being positively associated with some performance measures, but also negatively associated with other 
indicators. Consequently, the range of potential trade-offs between individual WFPs, and the precise composition of a 
basket of human resource innovations, are emphasised as key potential factors influencing the outcomes generated by 
flexibility programmes.  
Primary data analyses of 135 SMEs based in Lancashire, a north-west region of the UK, collected in 2009 at the 
height of the recent economic recession, portrays rich and varied employment relationships within respondent SMEs. 
Managers are shown to have been innovative and entrepreneurial in their reactions to recession, adapting their use of 
WFPs quickly, despite the popular view that SMEs would be limited in the scope of implementing WFPs. For 
instance, more than 70 percent of SMEs in the sample use training or job enrichment, offer teamwork or job 
autonomy, and have job security. Nevertheless, the WFPs with the highest incidence are not necessarily those which 
are also most likely to be associated with intended corporate performance outcomes. 
 Via zero-inflated Poisson and linear regressions, findings indicate which numerical, functional and cost WFPs 
implemented by SMEs may lead to the desired positive relationships with the three performance indicators analysed. 
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The results of several econometric analyses are presented in a practitioner-friendly style, especially in the summary 
compiled in Table 2, but also throughout the paper.  
Findings are relevant to practitioners and policy makers hoping to assist SMEs to enhance performance, 
showcasing the importance of using a combination of measures to assess the various relationships between WFPs and 
SME corporate performance. For instance, if intending to choose a specific basket of WFPs to implement, depending 
upon individual circumstances and what the firm wants to achieve, Table 2 can inform SME managers which WFPs 
could be most helpful. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, a different set of WFPs could be selected if an SME wanted to 
target redundancies (helpful WFPs here could be flexitime, profit related pay, and job sharing), absenteeism (useful 
WFPs here could be training or job enrichment, job security, job sharing, family friendly practices, and part-time 
work), or financial turnover (target WFPs here could be profit related pay, job security and staff pay freeze).  
The results indicate that the size and gender composition of an organisation appear to be significant factors, 
alongside WFPs such as flexitime, job sharing and job security, training and remuneration scheme changes. Firstly, 
with regard to numerical flexibility, flexitime links to low absenteeism, and family friendly practices link to low 
redundancies, but some numerical WFPs also associate with low financial turnover or are not significantly related to 
financial turnover. Secondly, with regard to functional flexibility, all WFPs in this paper appear to have a considerable 
potential in relation to absenteeism, with training or job enrichment, and job security being linked to lower levels of 
annual absenteeism of up to six days per employee. Lastly, with regard to cost flexibility, WFPs such as freezing staff 
pay and management pay, or cutting management pay and bonuses are practices which are found to be of limited help 
to SMEs dealing with recessionary pressures. Staff pay-freezes link to a high number of permanent-employee 
redundancies, whilst cost flexibility practices such as staff pay-freezes and management pay-cuts or management pay-
freezes link to low financial turnover.  
Limitations of this study arise mainly from the nature and size of the data. Firstly, one limitation derives from its 
cross-sectional nature, and hence inability to assign causality between observed variable relationships. Additional data 
sampling, introducing longitudinal aspects to the study, would, therefore, enhance the analysis. Secondly, there is 
relative over-selection of larger SMEs in the sample, yet the sample is matched relatively well to the regional or 
national profile of SMEs. Thirdly, the data sample size yields sufficient small and medium firm responses for data 
analysis in an otherwise relatively small sample. A larger dataset, consisting of more respondents and more answers 
per respondent, would allow for a wider variety of relationships between WFPs and firm performance to be tested at 
the same time as well as a more complex investigation of associations. Relatedly, the econometric models constructed 
had to be parsimonious relative to the number of variables tested, due to a combination of small number of SME 
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respondents and incomplete questionnaire responses. A larger dataset would also allow for splitting the sample 
according to various defining workplace characteristics, such as conducting comparative analysis on the workplace 
flexibility practices implemented in SMEs with a preponderance of female employee managers. Nevertheless, the 
paper highlights the degree of innovative response to conditions of constrained market demand, whilst simultaneously 
identifying potential benefits which SMEs may derive from further WFPs implementation. 
This paper addresses gaps in research on the use and incidence of WFPs in SMEs during a recessionary climate. 
Results validate the rationale for this research and offer reasons to encourage more similar research on workplace 
flexibility. There are good reasons to conclude that more lessons need to be learned in terms of managing workplace 
flexibility in SMEs during recession.  
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Table 1 
Correlation Matrix and Summary Statistics
a
 
 Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
SME Performance Indicators                        
1. Redundancies ^  0.65 2.03 1.00                     
2. Absenteeism ^  5.55 14.68 0.03 1.00                    
3. Financial turnover ^ 12.64 2.17 0.28 0.10 1.00                   
Workplace Characteristics                        
4. FirmSize ^ 18.59 34.16 0.30 0.11 0.29 1.00                  
5. FamilyOwned 0.63 0.48 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 1.00                 
6. Manufacturing 0.21 0.41 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.16 1.00                
7. StaffFemaleShare ^ 0.38 0.31 -0.13 0.14 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 -0.24 1.00               
8. ManagerFemaleShare ^ 0.33 0.35 -0.04 0.11 -0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.11 0.29 1.00              
9. MarketCompetition 0.51 0.50 0.11 -0.10 -0.07 0.21 -0.06 -0.03 -0.17 -0.15 1.00             
Workplace Flexibility Practices (WFPs)                        
Numerical flexibility                        
10. Home_or_MobileWork 0.44 0.50 -0.04 0.05 -0.20 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17 0.08 0.17 -0.03 1.00            
11. FamilyFriendly 0.41 0.49 0.05 -0.01 0.15 0.07 -0.19 -0.12 0.28 0.15 -0.30 0.13 1.00           
12. Part-TimeWork 0.37 0.49 0.06 0.12 -0.12 0.03 0.01 -0.11 0.27 0.15 -0.19 0.15 0.29 1.00          
13. Flexitime 0.25 0.44 -0.07 0.08 0.16 0.16 -0.05 -0.20 0.28 0.19 -0.10 0.16 0.30 0.17 1.00         
Functional flexibility                        
14. Teams_or_JobAut_or_EI 0.83 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 -0.03 -0.18 -0.01 -0.06 0.10 0.06 0.22 0.18 0.18 1.00        
15. Train_or_JobEnrichment 0.71 0.45 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.16 0.14 -0.16 0.13 0.10 0.01 -0.04 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.31 1.00       
16. JobSecurity 0.70 0.46 0.16 -0.01 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.06 -0.14 0.18 0.21 0.01 0.31 0.30 1.00      
17. JobSharing 0.12 0.33 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.09 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.03 1.00     
Cost flexibility                        
18. MgtPayCut_or_PayFreeze_or_BonusCut 0.54 0.50 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.20 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.00 1.00    
19. StaffPayFreeze 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.08 0.26 0.24 -0.15 0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.06 0.18 -0.06 0.27 1.00   
20. IndivPerformanceRelPay 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.02 -0.14 -0.06 -0.17 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.08 1.00  
21. ProfitRelPay 0.18 0.38 0.03 0.01 0.22 0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.19 -0.18 0.05 -0.12 0.01 -0.23 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.22 0.03 0.29 1.00 
a
Showing Pearson correlation matrix. N ranges from 101 to 135. S. D., Standard deviation. ^ shows a continuous measure is used for the respective workplace performance indicator, characteristic or practice. 
All other measures used are binary measures, taking the value one if the WFP is used and zero if the WFPs is not used by the SME. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Results: Relationships between Workplace Flexibility Practices (WFPs) and SME Performance Indicators
a 
  SME Performance Indicator: 
Redundancies 
SME Performance Indicator: 
Absenteeism 
SME Performance Indicator:  
Financial Turnover 
  WFPs Size
b
 WFPs Size
c
 WFPs Size
d
 
Relationships of a 
positive 
connotation  
between WFPs and 
SME performance 
indicators 
Numerical 
WFPs 
Flexitime 0.5*** 
FamilyFriendly 
Part-TimeWork 
2.8*** 
1.3** 
- 
 
Functional 
WFPs 
JobSharing 0.4** 
Train_or_JobEnrichment 
JobSecurity 
JobSharing 
5.9*** 
5.9*** 
4.4*** 
JobSecurity 1.2** 
Cost  
WFPs 
ProfitRelatedPay 2.2** -  
StaffPayFreeze 
ProfitRelatedPay 
0.8* 
1.8* 
Relationships of a 
negative 
connotation 
between WFPs and  
SME performance 
indicators 
Numerical 
WFPs 
Part-TimeWork 0.6* Home_or_MobileWork 2.5*** 
Home_or_MobileWork 
Part-TimeWork 
0.7* 
0.8* 
Functional 
WFPs 
JobSecurity 2.0** Teams_or_JobAut_or_EI 3.8*** -  
Cost  
WFPs 
StaffPayFreeze 0.8*** StaffPayFreeze 1.3** MgtPayCut_or_PayFreeze_or_BonusCut 0.9** 
a
This table reports only the statistically significant relationships, based on marginal effects reported in Table 3 and Table 4, and based on the coefficients reported in Table 5. The statistical significance of the 
relationships is shown as follows: *** means a highly significant relationship (p value <0.01); ** means a significant relationship (p value <0.05); and * means a marginally significant relationship (p value 
<0.1). N ranges from 101 to 135 across variables. 
b
The size of the WFPs-redundancies relationships relates to the annual estimated number of redundancies. For example, compared to SMEs without flexitime, SMEs implementing flexitime are likely to have 
an annual level of redundancies that is lower by 0.5 employees. Or, compared to SMEs not implementing part-time work, SMEs implementing part-time work are likely to have an annual level of 
redundancies that is higher by of 0.6 employees. 
c
The size of the WFPs-absenteeism relationships relates to the annual estimated number of days of absence per employee. For example, compared to SMEs without family friendly practices, SMEs 
implementing family friendly practices are likely to have an annual level of absenteeism that is lower by 2.8 days per employee. Or, compared to SMEs not implementing staff pay freezes, SMEs 
implementing staff pay freezes are likely to have an annual level of absenteeism that is higher by of 1.3 days per employee. 
d
The size of the relationships between WFPs and financial turnover relates to the annual estimated value of financial turnover. For example, compared to SMEs not offering employee job security, SMEs 
offering job security are likely to have an annual level of financial turnover that is higher by a factor of 1.2. Or, compared to SMEs not implementing pay cuts or pay freezes or bonus cuts for management, 
SMEs implementing some of these cost flexibility measures are likely to have an annual level of financial turnover that is lower by a factor of 0.9. 
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Table 3 
Results of Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression: Workplace Flexibility Practices and Redundancies
a
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Variable Coef. Signif. Dy/Dx Signif. Coef. Signif. Dy/Dx Signif. Coef. Signif. Dy/Dx Signif. 
 Count Data Models             
W
o
rk
p
la
ce
 
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 FirmSize 0.006 *** 0.013 ** 0.003  0.011  0.010 *** 0.005 ** 
FamilyOwned -0.477  0.072  -2.137 *** -0.634  0.086  0.086  
Manufacturing -0.374  -0.177  -1.022 ** -0.477 * -0.056  0.023  
StaffFemaleShare -2.904 *** -0.697  -2.485 *** -0.923  -2.346 ** -0.256  
ManagerFemaleShare 1.259  0.034  3.069 *** 0.847  -0.348  -0.260  
MarketCompetition -0.479  0.290  -2.936 *** -0.657  -0.410  0.214  
N
u
m
er
ic
a
l 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Home_or_MobileWork 0.523  0.265          
FamilyFriendly 0.291  0.142          
Part-TimeWork 1.091 ** 0.620 *         
Flexitime -1.217 *** -0.459 ***         
Constant 1.319 ***           
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Teams_or_JobAut_or_EI     -3.080 ** -7.530      
Train_or_JobEnrichment     0.116  0.064      
JobSecurity     5.183 *** 2.015 **     
JobSharing     -1.075 * -0.425 **     
Constant     2.310 **       
C
o
st
 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 MgtPayCut_or_PayFreeze_or_BonusCut         -0.701  -0.235  
StaffPayFreeze         1.687 *** 0.847 *** 
IndivPerformanceRelPay         0.529  0.199  
ProfitRelatedPay         -0.965 * -0.232 ** 
Constant         0.846    
 Inflate Equations             
 FirmSize -0.028 *   -0.022 *   -0.011    
 FamilyOwned -0.840    -1.529 *   -0.287    
 Manufacturing 0.057    0.091    -0.195    
 StaffFemaleShare -1.941    -1.201    -2.332    
 ManagerFemaleShare 1.605    2.207 *   0.713    
 MarketCompetition -1.525 **   -2.417 ***   -1.726 *   
 Constant 3.003 ***   3.179 ***   2.571 ***   
aCoef., Coefficient. Signif., Significance shown as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dy/Dx, Marginal effects. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean.  
Model 1: N = 111, non-zero observations = 23, zero observations = 88, Voung test statistic 2.32**; Model 2: N = 110, non-zero observations = 21, zero observations = 89, Voung test statistic 2.52***; Model 
3: N = 111, non-zero observations = 22, zero observations = 89, Voung test statistic 1.98**. 
 30 
 
Table 4 
Results of Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression: Workplace Flexibility Practices and Absenteeism
a
 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Variable Coef. Signif. Dy/Dx Signif. Coef. Signif. Dy/Dx Signif. Coef. Signif. Dy/Dx Signif. 
 Count Data Models             
W
o
rk
p
la
ce
 
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 FirmSize 0.004 *** 0.093 *** 0.004 *** 0.089 ** 0.002 ** 0.096 *** 
FamilyOwned 0.235 ** 1.614 ** 0.789 *** 4.589 *** 0.370 *** 2.239 *** 
Manufacturing -0.188  -1.040  -0.263 * -1.388 * -0.261 * -1.321  
StaffFemaleShare 0.570 *** 4.570 *** -0.020  0.773  0.006  1.396  
ManagerFemaleShare 0.688 *** 3.449 *** 1.496 *** 8.551 *** 1.037 *** 5.546 *** 
MarketCompetition -0.605 *** -3.744 *** -0.400 *** -2.507 *** -0.446 *** -2.778 *** 
N
u
m
er
ic
a
l 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Home_or_MobileWork 0.386 *** 2.489 ***         
FamilyFriendly -0.467 *** -2.807 ***         
Part-TimeWork -0.216 ** -1.293 **         
Flexitime 0.151  0.964          
Constant 1.647 ***           
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Teams_or_JobAut_or_EI     0.819 *** 3.834 ***     
Train_or_JobEnrichment     -0.785 *** -5.941 ***     
JobSecurity     -0.775 *** -5.931 ***     
JobSharing     -1.028 *** -4.443 ***     
Constant     1.665 ***       
C
o
st
 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 MgtPayCut_or_PayFreeze_or_BonusCut         -0.055  -0.338  
StaffPayFreeze         0.202 ** 1.306 ** 
IndivPerformanceRelPay         -0.010  -0.061  
ProfitRelatedPay         -0.018  -0.109  
Constant         1.540 ***   
 Inflate Equations             
 FirmSize -0.178 ***   -0.198 ***   -0.171 ***   
 FamilyOwned -0.504    0.024    -0.045    
 Manufacturing -0.170    -0.424    -0.481    
 StaffFemaleShare -2.761 **   -2.747 **   -2.871 ***   
 ManagerFemaleShare 2.071 **   1.904 **   1.830 **   
 MarketCompetition -0.082    0.145    0.016    
 Constant 1.308 *   1.230 *   1.300 *   
aCoef., Coefficient; Signif., Significance shown as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dy/Dx, Marginal effects. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean. Model 4: N = 101, non-zero observations = 68, zero 
observations = 33, Voung test statistic 2.20**; Model 5: N = 102, non-zero observations = 67, zero observations = 35, Voung test statistic 2.98***; Model 6: N = 102, non-zero observations = 67, zero 
observations = 35, Voung test statistic 3.29***. 
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Table 5 
Results of Linear Regression (OLS): Workplace Flexibility Practices and Financial Turnover
a
 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Variable Coef. Signif. Coef. Signif. Coef. Signif. 
W
o
rk
p
la
ce
 
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 FirmSize 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 
FamilyOwned -0.012  -0.167  -0.027  
Manufacturing 0.695  0.606  0.710  
StaffFemaleShare 0.641  0.425  0.743  
ManagerFemaleShare -0.555  -0.412  -0.509  
MarketCompetition -0.546  -0.634  -0.469  
N
u
m
er
ic
a
l 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Home_or_MobileWork -0.725 *     
FamilyFriendly 0.495      
Part-TimeWork -0.820 *     
Flexitime 0.429      
Constant 12.448 ***     
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 Teams_or_JobAut_or_EI   -0.118    
Train_or_JobEnrichment   -0.632    
JobSecurity   1.204 **   
JobSharing   0.111    
Constant   12.026 ***   
C
o
st
 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 MgtPayCut_or_PayFreeze_or_BonusCut     -0.923 ** 
StaffPayFreeze     0.833 * 
IndivPerformanceRelPay     0.156  
ProfitRelatedPay     1.082 * 
Constant     12.086 *** 
aCoef., Coefficient; Signif., Significance shown as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Evaluated at the mean, marginal effects after OLS would be the same as the OLS slope coefficients, so marginal effects do 
not need to be reported. Model 7: N = 106, R Squared = 0.34, F test statistic = 4.94***. Model 8: N = 105, R Squared = 0.32, F test statistic = 4.43***. Model 9: N = 106, R Squared = 0.34, F test statistic = 
4.85**
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Model for Analysing the Relationship between Workplace Flexibility Practices (WFPs) and 
Firm Performance: Testing Nine Models 
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Numerical WFPs 
 Firm using these WFPs: 
Working from home; or 
Tele-working; or 
Mobile working 
 Family friendly 
practices 
 Part-time working 
 Flexitime 
 
Functional WFPs 
 Firm using these WFPs: 
Teamworking; or Employee job 
autonomy; or Employee involvement 
in decision making 
 Firm using these WFPs:  
 Training staff to increase their 
current skills; or Job enrichment 
(training staff to do jobs other than 
their main job) 
 Employee job security 
 Job sharing 
Cost WFPs 
 Firm using these WFPs: 
Management pay cut; or 
Management pay freeze; or 
Management voluntarily 
forgo bonus or commission 
pay 
 Staff pay freeze 
 Individual performance 
related pay 
 Profit related pay 
Model 1 
Model 2 
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Appendix 1 
Description of Workplace Flexibility Practices Analysed 
The questionnaire asked Small and Medium Enterprises about their use of workplace flexibility practices in the context of 
the 2009 economic recession, specifically: "In response to recession in your organisation, please rate the use of these 
practices over the past 12 months?" 
 Workplace Flexibility Practices (WFPs): 
Name of WFPs as Used in Analysis  
and Full Name of WFPs  
Indicative Definition of WFPs 
N
u
m
er
ic
a
l 
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y 
 
Home_or_MobileWork 
Full name: Firm using these WFPs: 
Working from home; or  
Tele-working; or  
Mobile working 
This set of WFPs combines working at home, with various forms of working 
away from the main office, on a regular or intermittent basis.  
An employee may be working from home occasionally, or for an agreed 
number of days each week. It also relates to the use of telecommunications and 
technology, such as Voice over IP (VoIP) and video-conferencing, to replace 
work related travel and enable working from home. 
FamilyFriendly 
Full Name: Family friendly practices 
These are practices designed to help employees balance work and family 
roles. Examples include alternative work arrangements to make it easier for 
parents to work at particular times in the year (e.g. school tem time) or to 
change working times in view of child-care arrangements, or dependent care 
support. 
Part-TimeWork 
Full name: Part-time working 
Part-time employees are those contracted to work less than full-time hours. 
Flexitime 
Full name: Flexitime 
Workers have the freedom to work in any way they choose outside a set core 
of hours determined by the employer. They may vary their start, finish and 
break times each day, but sometimes within agreed limits. 
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
l 
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
 
Teams_or_JobAut_or_EI 
Full name: Firm using these WFPs:  
Teamworking; or  
Employee job autonomy; or  
Employee involvement in decision 
making 
This practice involves organising employees into teams based on a distinct 
product, part of a process, or service. This may cut across existing functional 
divides. Teams are sometimes given a high degree of responsibility and 
expected to work with increased flexibility. 
Job autonomy relates to the degree or level of freedom and discretion allowed 
to an employee over his or her job. Via job autonomy, employees are allowed a 
degree of choice over issues such as how their work is done, where their work is 
done, the pace of their work, their tasks to be done, or a combination of these 
issues. 
Implementing employee involvement practices means creating an 
environment in which employees have an impact on decisions and actions that 
affect their jobs. 
Train_or_JobEnrichment 
Full name: Firm using these WFPs: 
Training staff to increase their current 
skills; or  
Job enrichment (training staff to do jobs 
other than their main job) 
Training programmes may be implemented to target the current range of skills 
for the workforce and develop these skills. Or, training programmes may be 
implemented to allow the workforce to expand their current range of skills and 
include skills related to tasks other than their main tasks, thereby "enriching" 
their jobs. 
JobSecurity 
Full name: Employee job security 
Assurance that an employee has about the continuity of gainful employment 
for his or her work life. Job security usually arises from the terms of the contract 
of employment, collective bargaining agreements, or labour legislation that 
prevents arbitrary termination, layoffs, and lockouts. It may also be affected by 
general economic conditions. 
JobSharing 
Full name: Job sharing 
This is a work arrangement in which more than one employees share one job. 
In effect, these employees work part-time, although their combined hours make 
up the equivalent of a full-time job. So job sharing is a form of part-time 
working where two (or occasionally more) people share the responsibility for a 
full-time job. They share the pay and benefits in proportion to the hours each 
works. Job sharers may work, for instance, split days, split weeks, or alternate 
weeks 
C
o
st
 f
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 
MgtPayCut_or_PayFreeze_or_BonusCut 
Full name: Firm using these WFPs:  
Management pay cut; or Management 
pay freeze; or  
Management voluntarily forgo bonus or 
commission pay 
Usually as part of a firm's cost-cutting efforts, management may see a 
decrease in their usual wages, or have their pay kept constant (frozen) over a 
period of time, or voluntarily agree to not take their bonus or commission pay  
StaffPayFreeze 
Full name: Staff pay freeze 
Staff pay is kept constant (frozen) over a period of time, usually as part of a 
firm's cost-cutting efforts. 
IndivPerformanceRelPay 
Full name: Individual performance related 
pay 
Pay levels, bonus earnings or other financial rewards are based on an 
assessment or appraisal of an individual employee’s performance against 
previously set objectives. 
ProfitRelPay 
Full name: Profit related pay 
The amount of pay or other financial rewards received are directly linked to 
the firm's profitability. 
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Appendix 2 
Technical Notes on Estimation Methods 
 
Via zero-inflated Poisson regressions it is assumed in this paper that there are two simultaneous processes 
generating the zero level of redundancies and absenteeism. On the one hand, some SMEs will not lay off any 
employees because there the managers follow an absolute rule of keeping their staff levels constant. With regard 
to absenteeism, some employees may have an absolute rule of no voluntary absenteeism. On the other hand, 
other SMEs may choose to not lay off permanent employees in the period observed. Similarly, some other 
employees may chose voluntarily during the observed period to be or not to be absent. The separate processes 
influencing the zero outcome are both influencing the outcome Y=0, so the zero-inflated count data models 
allows to account for both processes via an inflation equation. So, in a zero-inflated model, the outcome is 
determined by the absolute rule of never laying off staff or no involuntary absenteeism with probability pi, as 
well as the count data process with probability 1 - pi, whereby: 
Prob [Yi = 0] = pi + (1 - pi ) Ri (0)         (4) 
Prob [Yi = j > 0] = (1 - pi ) Ri (j)         (5) 
where Ri(·) is the count data model probability. The ancillary state probability, pi, can be estimated either via a 
logit or a probit model. The count data model, "inflate equations" containing the assumed factors that may 
determine whether the observed count is zero, and the marginal effects are reported in Table 3, respectively 
Table 4. In this paper, the inflate equations have been estimated by logit, and they assume that the determinants 
of excess zero counts for Redundancies and Absenteeism are the set of six workplace characteristics variables.  
For further information on the method of zero-inflated Poisson regressions, see Vuong (1989), Greene 
(1994), Long (1997) or Wooldridge (2002). 
A further indication that zero-inflated Poisson models fitted the data best comes from the observation that 
both dependent variables Redundancies and Absenteeism are over-dispersed, meaning that their standard 
deviation is higher than their mean. According to Long (1997) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998) this result 
should indicate to a researcher that it is not feasible to use a simple Poisson model in which the mean and 
standard deviation are constrained to be equal. Zero-inflated Poisson models have already been used in the 
literature to model absenteeism, for example in Frick and Malo (2008).  
Following the work reported by Yanadori and Kato (2009), models were estimated initially separately with 
each WFP's association with the dependent variable being observed. Yanadori and Kato (2009) concentrated 
only on four WFPs: flexitime, longer maternity leave, longer child care leave and longer nursing care leave. In 
contrast, this research reports results for more than 12 WFPs. Therefore, due to space limitation, models where 
independent variables are entered one at a time are discussed but not reported; instead only the full model 
specifications are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  
Alternative estimations, for instance using a probit model on dependent variables generated as dummies for 
non-zero values, have given similar results. Furthermore, numerous estimations with slightly modified sets of 
workplace characteristics and / or selection of independent variables have been trialled, and alongside with post-
estimation tests - for the dependent variable Financial Turnover too - they indicate that the research results 
presented here are consistent and robust. 
 
